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RUBRIC

BC Teachers’ Federation v British
Columbia: The Supreme Court Takes
a School Holiday
Eric Tucker
A little over a decade ago, in Health Services1, the Supreme Court of
Canada (SCC) held that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ guarantee of
freedom of association “protects the capacity of members of labour unions
to engage in collective bargaining on workplace issues.” This decision broke
from the SCC’s previous view, which limited constitutional protection to the
right to organize, but not the right to engage in core associational activities.
However, the constitutional right to collective bargaining did not emerge
fully formed from that judgment and the strength of the court’s commitment
to constitutional labour rights was untested. Since that time, the SCC has
issued fve additional judgments evincing varying levels of support for and
interpretations of constitutionalized labour rights. In its most recent case,
British Columbia Teachers’ Federation2, the Court had an opportunity to clarify
the ambiguities arising from its previous judgments, but instead it chose to
take a pass. In a rather sphinx-like, two sentence oral judgment from the
bench, Chief Justice McLachlan declared: “The majority of the Court would
allow the appeal, substantially for the reasons of Justice Donald. Justices Côté
and Brown would dissent and dismiss the appeal, substantially for the reasons
of the majority in the Court of Appeal.” Thus not only did the court fail to
provide its own reasons, but it also limited what we could draw from the
British Columbia Court of Appeal’s (BCCA) judgments 3 to which it referred,
since we cannot know what parts of those judgments caused the majority and
dissenting judgments to qualify their agreement as being “substantial” rather
than complete.4 The result leaves us to ponder which direction this court, with
Eric Tucker, Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada (etucker@yorku.ca).
1

Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Association v British Columbia,
2007 SCC 27 at para 2 [Health Services].

2

British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v British Columbia, 2016 SCC 49 [BCTF (2016)].

3

British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v British Columbia, 2015 BCCA 184 [BCTF (2015)].

4

Which is not to say that the SCC’s reversal of the BCCA was unimportant for the province.
The effect of its judgment was to restore collective bargaining language limiting class sizes,
requiring BC school boards to hire thousands of additional teachers.
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its rapidly changing membership, will go in future constitutional labour rights
cases.5
The purpose of this brief intervention is not to make predictions, a fraught
exercise in any event, but rather to explore the unresolved jurisprudential ambiguities, which, it is argued, are tied to deeper tensions embedded in our
political economy and in industrial pluralism’s signature labour rights regime,
Wagnerism. The Wagner model crystalized a set of labour laws and institutions in the post-World War II era that sought to contain class conflict
through a set of compromises. It promised militant workers a fairer share
of socially produced wealth by enabling the exercise of collective power to
partially offset the unequal bargaining power written into the DNA of capitalist social relations. At the same time, it entrenched managerial control
over investment and production decisions to facilitate the pursuit of profits,
also an imperative of capitalism. Statutory labour laws and labour board and
judicial jurisprudence shifted back and forth between these poles at different
times and different places so that ambiguity and incremental change became
permanent features of the regime.
This contradiction takes a special form in the context of public sector collective bargaining, where industrial pluralism itself is often under assault by
neo-liberal governments’ growing intolerance of collective bargaining as they
seek to impose austerity measures on their own workforces. Most constitutional labour rights cases arise in this context, often involving abrogations of
collective agreements and restrictions on the freedom to strike. As a result, the
court faces a sharp contradiction between the state’s evisceration of collective
bargaining and worker bargaining power on the one hand, and Wagnerism’s
commitment to partially offset unequal bargaining power on the other. In this
context, it is not surprising that jurisprudential ambiguities abound.
We begin the analysis of these ambiguities with a brief discussion of the
Health Services case, which planted its seeds. We then look at the twisted
road subsequent cases have followed in Fraser6, Mounted Police Association
of Ontario7; Saskatchewan Federation of Labour8; and Meredith9; and then
5

Of the seven justices who decided Health Services, only McLachlin and Abella were still on
the bench when BCTF (2016) was decided. Five of the nine SCC judges on BCTF have not sat
on any previous SCC constitutional labour rights cases. Since BCTF, McLachlan retired and
was replaced by Sheila Martin. Among the current justices, only Abella has authored a labour
rights judgment and she is the only holdover from Health Services.

6

Fraser v Ontario (Attorney-General), 2011 SCC 20 [Fraser].

7

Mounted Police Association of Ontario v Attorney General of Canada, 2015 SCC 1 [MPAO].

8

Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4 [SFL].

9

Meredith v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 2 [Meredith].
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examine more closely the BCCA’s judgments in BCTF10, which the SCC “substantially” adopted.

Health Services
The case arose out of the efforts of a neo-liberal British Columbia government
to restructure the provision of health care through the privatization of health
support services.11 To do so, it needed to strip job security provisions out of an
existing collective agreement and prohibit future bargaining on those issues.
It enacted Bill 29 hastily and without any meaningful consultation with the
affected unions.12 The union challenged the legislation as being in violation of
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. To the surprise of most
observers, the SCC ruled Bill 29 unconstitutional. In doing so, the SCC reversed
its earlier jurisprudence and held that freedom of association protected a right to
collective bargaining. But the holding was not so simple.
First, the SCC created some level of ambiguity about what was being protected. On the one hand, it made clear that the constitutional right to collective bargaining could not be reduced to a mere right to make collective representations13
and, indeed, made the duty to bargain in good faith and to make reasonable
efforts to arrive at an acceptable contract a central feature of this constitutional
right.14 Tellingly, the court referenced its decision in Royal Oak Mines15 as a key
source for understanding the nature of the constitutional duty to bargain even
though that case elaborated on the statutory duty to bargain in good faith as
it exists within our Wagner Act model of labour law. On the other hand, earlier
in its judgement, the court insisted that it was not constitutionalizing a particular model of labour relations or a specifc bargaining model.16 Because the case
involved government abrogating collective agreement clauses and completely
prohibiting future collective bargaining on those issues, without any bargaining
or consultation, the court did not have to elaborate further on what other processes, if any, might pass constitutional muster.
The SCC layered a second level of ambiguity over the frst when it also held
that not every interference with the process of collective bargaining violated
10 BCTF 2015, supra note 3.
11 For the background, see David Camfeld (2007). For my take on the case, see Tucker

(2008).
12 Health and Social Services Delivery Improvement Act, SBC 2002, c 2 [Bill 29, 2002].
13 Health Services, supra note 1 at para 109.
14 Ibid at paras 97-105.
15 Royal Oak Mines Inc v Canada (Labour Relations Board), [1996] 1 SCR 369 [Royal Oak Mines].
16 Health Services, supra note 1 at para 91.
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freedom of association. The Charter, it said, only protected against “‘substantial
interference’ with associational activity.”17 The court explained that the test for
“substantial interference” was “whether the process of voluntary, good faith
collective bargaining between employees and the employer has been, or is likely
to be, signifcantly and adversely affected”, and that this was to be determined
by looking at the importance of the matter affected and whether the government
action respected the duty to consult and negotiate in good faith.18 In part, this
determination depended on the baseline understanding of the scope and content
of the duty to bargain in good faith (the frst ambiguity), but then required
these two additional assessments, the second of which was the impact of the
measure on the process of good faith bargaining and consultation. This raised
the possibility that, although a government measure might abrogate a collective
agreement, it could do so without substantially interfering with the process of
collective bargaining by, for example, consulting with affected unions about its
concerns prior to taking action. However, because the BC government acted
peremptorily, without an opportunity for meaningful consultation in advance of
enacting Bill 29, there was no need for further clarifcation.
The fnal layer of ambiguity arose in the section 1 analysis, where the government has the opportunity to demonstrate that the violation of constitutional
rights is justifable in a free and democratic society. In addition to showing that
it was pursuing a pressing and substantial objective and that the means it chose
were rationally connected to the achievement of its objective, the government
must also show that the means chosen minimally impaired the right that was
violated. Here again, the question arose as to the relevance of pre-legislative consultations with the union. On the one hand, the court said evidence of consultations was relevant in determining whether the government had considered less
intrusive options19, while on the other hand, it also implied that such consultations themselves reduced the level of impairment, in a way that was analogous to
its substantial interference analysis. But in this case it had done neither. “The government also failed to engage in meaningful bargaining or consultation prior to
the adoption of Bill 29 or to provide the unions with any other means of exerting
meaningful infuence over the outcome of the process (for example, a satisfactory system of labour conciliation or arbitration)”.20 This formulation raised the
possibility that consultations could save legislation that might otherwise be invalid either by reducing the level of interference below the constitutional threshold
or by justifying the legislation as minimally impairing.
17 Ibid at para 90.
18 Ibid at paras 92-97.
19 Ibid at para 157.
20 Ibid at para 159.
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Underlying these doctrinal ambiguities was a lack of clarity about the rationale
for constitutionalizing collective bargaining. The court provided three grounds for its
judgment: Canadian labour history, Canada’s international law commitments and
Charter values, including enhancing human dignity, liberty, autonomy, democracy
and equality. In so doing, it recognized, as it had in previous employment law judgments, that employment is a structurally unequal power relation in which employees are subordinated to employers and that collective bargaining was a means to
palliate that inequality.21 However, it did not place the amelioration of power imbalances, or for that matter any other particular value, at the centre of its analysis. This
pluralism was quite consistent with Wagnerism, and its unresolved internal tensions,
including debates over the issue of whether good faith bargaining is merely procedural or has a substantive element responsive to the employer’s superior bargaining
power. If the latter, then it would be necessary to examine the content of bargaining
positions to determine whether one party was making substantively unreasonable
demands. It was not surprising then that Health Services embodied a similar ambiguity about the scope of the constitutional duty of good faith bargaining.

Working the Ambiguities: From Fraser to Meredith
Health Services created ambiguities, but the case law that followed did little to
resolve them. Indeed, in Fraser22, the frst case to reach the court after Health Services, the SCC amplifed them. In particular, it used the SCC’s caution in Health
Services that it was not constitutionalizing a particular process to step back from
that judgment’s apparent embrace of good faith bargaining as understood in
the context of existing statutory collective bargaining regimes. This paved the
way for the SCC to allow collective bargaining regimes that required something
less—“a good faith process of consideration by the employer of employee representations and of discussion with their representatives”23—to pass constitutional
muster. Not only did Fraser seem to lower the constitutional baseline, but it also
upped the ante with regard to the standard for determining whether the government’s interference with that thin process was unconstitutional. Instead of the
“substantial interference” test from Health Services, the court in Fraser seemed
to substitute a “substantial impossibility” test. “In every case, the question is
whether the impugned law or state action has the effect of making it impossible
to act collectively to achieve workplace goals”.24 More generally, support for the
project of constitutionalizing labour rights seemed to be slipping as two justices,
21 Ibid at para 84.
22 Fraser, supra note 6.
23 Ibid at para 43.
24 Ibid at para 46.
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Rothstein and Charron, neither of whom participated in Health Services, would
have reversed that judgment, while a third, Deschamps, who had dissented in
part in Health Services, would have achieved the same result through her interpretation of its effect.25
Given the tone and trajectory of Fraser, the three labour rights cases released
by the SCC in January 2015 came as a surprise. Not only did they seemingly sideline (but not overrule) Fraser, they strengthened and extended the labour rights
protected by the Charter guarantee of freedom of association without, however,
resolving the legacy of ambiguity from Health Services.
Beginning with the frst judgment, Mounted Police Association of Ontario26,
the court struck down the imposition of a non-union representation plan on
RCMP members because the scheme deprived these employees of a suffcient
degree of choice and independence to enable them to meaningfully pursue
collective workplace goals. In so doing, the court added choice and independence
as two requirements that governments needed to respect in constructing a
constitutionally valid labour relations regime. In reaching that conclusion, the
court found it necessary to address the principles that inform its interpretation of
what a constitutional right to a meaningful collective bargaining process entails.
Drawing heavily on the former Chief Justice Dickson’s dissent in Reference re
Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.)27, the court adopted a purposive
approach that centred on the protection of individuals against more powerful
entities and the promotion of equality. “Nowhere are these dual functions of
s. 2(d) more pertinent than in labour relations. Individual employees typically
lack the power to bargain and pursue workplace goals with their more powerful
employers. Only by banding together in collective bargaining associations, thus
strengthening their bargaining power with their employer, can they meaningfully
pursue their workplace goals”.28
This approach had implications for resolving some of the Health Services
ambiguities. First, the baseline process must not reduce employees’ negotiating
power so that they are unable to meaningfully pursue their goals.29 A process
that merely provides for employee consultation, without providing a modicum of
bargaining leverage would clearly fail to pass constitutional muster. The court’s
embrace of the more robust interpretation of collective bargaining implicit in
25 For a collection of essays, including mine, that explain Fraser’s background and are sharply

critical of the result, see Faraday, Fudge and Tucker (2012).
26 MPAO, supra note 7.
27 Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta), [1987] 1 SCR 313.
28 MPAO, supra note 7 at para 70.
29 Ibid at para 71.
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Health Services refected a shift toward the equality-enhancing pole of industrial
pluralism. This turn toward equality was also apparent in the court’s re-affrmation
of the “substantial interference” test30 and its focus on the impact of the state’s
action on employee bargaining power. “A process that substantially interferes
with a meaningful process of collective bargaining by reducing employees’
negotiating power is therefore inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom
of association…”.31 However, given the context of the case, the court did not
have to address the question of whether government consultation prior to the
enactment of legislation could render the interference less than substantial or
make the action minimally impairing under a s. 1 analysis.
The emphasis in MPAO on a process that provides workers with a modicum of bargaining power to achieve their collective goals foretold the result of
the Saskatchewan Federation of Labour case32, which held, for the frst time, that
freedom of association protects the right to strike or an acceptable substitute. The
court identifed the right to strike as the “powerhouse” of collective bargaining,
which was required to achieve “approximate equality”.33 This fnding further reduced two of the core ambiguities of Health Services. First, it clarifed that a process
that did not provide workers with the collective power to withdraw their services
was constitutionally defcient. Mere consultation or consultation that only required
good faith consideration of employee proposals could not pass constitutional muster. Second, the denial of the freedom to engage in a collective withdraw of services
amounted to a substantial interference with collective bargaining since it deprived
workers of the power needed to meaningfully pursue their workplace goals.34
The context of the SFL case did not require the court to consider whether consultation prior to the enactment of legislation depriving workers of freedom of
association could save it. That said, given the court’s analysis, it would be hard to
imagine consulting with unions prior to depriving them permanently of the right to
strike would be curative since its effect would be to strip them of bargaining leverage on an ongoing basis. But what about ad hoc back-to-work legislation to end
a lawful strike or lock-out, or legislation that peremptorily imposed an agreement
prior to a strike or lock-out?
This brings us to Meredith35, the middle case in the 2015 trilogy. The case
squarely raised the question of whether government action rolling back three30 Ibid at paras 74-77.
31 Ibid at para 71.
32 SFL, supra note 8.
33 Ibid at para 55. The court was citing language from an article I co-authored with Professor

Judy Fudge (Fudge and Tucker, 2010).
34 SFL, supra note 8 at para 75.
35 Meredith, supra note 9.
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years of agreed upon wage increases for RCMP members amounted to substantial interference with the bargaining process. The case was complicated
by the fact that the court had just held in MPAO that the consultation process leading to these increases was itself constitutionally defcient. Nevertheless, the court was prepared to consider that substantial interference with
that defcient process could violate freedom of association.36 However, the
majority of the court held that the federal Expenditure Restraint Act37(ERA),
which imposed wage restraint across the entire public service, did not substantially interfere with “the collective pursuit of the workplace goals of
RCMP members”.38 The SCC justifed this result on the basis that the wage
cap imposed by the statute was consistent with the increase negotiated with
other bargaining units “and so refected an outcome consistent with actual
bargaining.”39 The SCC also took into account that the law did not preclude
discussion on other issues.40
We might view the case as an anomaly given its factual context, but the SCC’s
reasoning ignored the equality promoting analysis that was so crucial to its holding in MPAO. First, the fact that the government was able to negotiate agreements with other bargaining units in the shadow of the ERA fails to acknowledge
that the impending legislation substantially reduced the bargaining power of those
bargaining units subject to it. If the MPAO analysis applied, surely such legislation
must be “inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom of association”.41 Second,
even if the government had reduced the extent of its interference by consulting
and bargaining with other bargaining units, RCMP members were completely
deprived of any opportunity to consult even within the confnes of their constitutionally defcient scheme. Can bargaining with Peter really satisfy your duty to
bargain with Paul?
Overall, while MPAO and SFL went some distance toward resolving the
ambiguities of Health Services, Meredith undermined their impact. It allowed
government interference with an existing agreement without any consultation,
and gave credence to agreements reached under the threat of wage restraint
legislation that deprived workers of the freedom to strike—the powerhouse of
collective bargaining—and thus substantially reduced their ability to bargain from
“approximate equality.”
36 Ibid at para 25.
37 Expenditure Restraint Act, SC 2009, c 2, s 393.
38 Meredith, supra note 9 at para 30.
39 Ibid at para 29.
40 Ibid at para 30.
41 MPAO, supra note 7 at para 71.
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BC Teachers: The SCC Takes a Pass
The BCTF case provided the SCC with an ideal opportunity to revisit and clarify
the ambiguities stemming from its Health Services judgment. After all, the case
originated in the same neo-liberal assault on labour rights that launched the
Health Services litigation.42 Bill 2843 stripped the teachers of negotiated contract
protections in relation to class size, among other matters, and prohibited future
collective bargaining over these matters, just as Bill 29 had stripped collective
bargaining rights from health service workers. After years of delay, while awaiting
the outcome of the Health Services case, in 2011 the BC Supreme Court found
that Bill 28 was unconstitutional. It substantially and unjustifably interfered with
the collective bargaining rights of teachers.44 Justice Griffn issued a declaration
of invalidity with the usual one-year suspension to allow the government time
to devise a constitutionally valid response. A period of consultations/negotiations
followed, without an agreement. The government then enacted Bill 2245, which
continued to override contractual limits on class size, but permitted future
negotiations on the subject. The BCTF challenged the law, claiming that it too
violated freedom of association by substantially and unjustifably interfering with
collective bargaining.
Justice Griffn also heard this case and upheld the BCTF’s challenge. Her
judgment had two prongs. The frst was a factual fnding that the BC government
bargained in bad faith by coming into the process with a closed mind, unwilling
to consider contractual limits on class size. The second was a legal holding that
pre-legislative consultations were not relevant to the determination of whether
the legislation substantially interfered with constitutionally protected bargaining
rights.46 The BC government appealed and a majority of the BCCA (4 to 1)
reversed Griffn’s judgment.47 The court released its judgment three months after
the SCC’s 2015 trilogy.48
The majority judgment, written by Chief Justice Bauman and Justice Harris,
held that pre-legislative consultations are an important contextual factor in determining whether the government substantially interfered with collective bar42 For background on teacher collective bargaining in BC, see Slinn (2011, 2012).
43 Education Services Collective Agreement Act, SBC 2002, c 1 and the Public Education Flexi-

bility and Choice Act, SBC 2002, c 3 [Bill 28, 2002].
44 British Columbia Teachers’ Federation (Chudnosky) v British Columbia, 2011 BCSC 469.
45 Education Improvement Act, SBC 2012, c 3 [Bill 22, 2012].
46 British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v British Columbia, 2014 BCSC 121.
47 BCTF (2015), supra note 3.
48 The court gave the parties an opportunity to make written submissions addressing their

implications for this case.
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gaining rights. As well, they also rejected Griffths’ fnding that the government
bargained in bad faith, largely on the basis that it was inappropriate to have
inquired into the substantive reasonableness of a party’s negotiating position.49
Justice Donald dissented. He agreed with the majority that pre-legislative consultations are relevant, although his reasons were different. However, he disagreed
with their decision to overrule the trial judge’s fnding of fact that the government bargained in bad faith, in part because of the deference that an appeal
court owes the fnder of fact, but more importantly because he disagreed with
their interpretation of the constitutional test for good faith bargaining and its
application in this case. However, as noted at the beginning of this comment, the
majority of the SCC50 reversed the BCCA, substantially for the reasons of Justice
Donald, and so it is his judgment that bears scrutiny regarding the resolution of
constitutional ambiguities.
The most fundamental constitutional ambiguity is with respect to the process freedom of association protects. As we saw, while Fraser embraced a
thin process of consultation, MPAO and SFL had in mind a process of collective bargaining in which there was an approximate equalization of bargaining power, although Meredith seemed to ignore that consideration entirely.
Donald J.’s judgment refects rather than clarifes this ambiguity. On the one
hand, he accepts the MPAO approach and applies it to pre-legislative consultations: “Pre-legislative consultation, then, can be seen as a replacement for
the traditional collective bargaining process, only if it truly is a meaningful
substitution. To be meaningful, the bargaining parties must consult from an
assumed position of ‘approximate equality’”.51 On the other hand, his application of the principle is deeply fawed. Under what conceivable arrangements
can workers acting collectively “consult from a position of ‘approximate equality’” with the government, especially once we understand, as the SCC did in
SFL, that the freedom to strike is the powerhouse of collective bargaining and
thus the source of “approximate equality”? Political strikes have never been
acceptable in Canada and are nearly always unlawful under current labour
legislation, which prohibits workers from striking during the life of a collective
agreement. Donald J. ignores this reality and, therefore, is able to affrm that
the consultation process preceding the enactment of the ERA, endorsed by
the SCC in Meredith, was an adequate substitute for collective bargaining. In
the result, we are left to ponder the strength of the SCC’s commitment to the
requirement of “approximate equality” and what balance must be reached for
that standard to be met.
49 BCTF (2015), supra note 3 at para 147.
50 BCTF (2016), supra note 2.
51 BCTF (2015), supra note 3 at para 291.
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The other baseline ambiguity is with the “good faith” requirement. Recall that in Health Services the SCC seemingly embraced the statutory standard of good faith bargaining articulated in its Royal Oak Mines judgment
as the constitutional standard, while simultaneously insisting that it was not
constitutionalizing a particular model of bargaining. However, Fraser seemed
to suggest it was suffcient to require that the employer listen to or read
collective representations in good faith to pass constitutional muster. The issue was central to the BCTF litigation because the trial judge found that the
government had entered the process with a closed mind. In part, this was a
factual fnding, but it also depended on a prior legal judgment about what
good faith bargaining requires in a constitutional context. The majority of the
BCCA cited labour board case law regarding the statutory duty to bargain in
order to inform its interpretation of the constitutional duty, while also insisting
it was not constitutionalizing a particular model. However, their interpretation of the statutory duty to bargain in good faith differed from that of the
SCC. Based on BC labour board jurisprudence, they did not allow a review of
the parties’ negotiating positions for substantive reasonableness.52 Indeed,
the BCCA ignored the SCC’s judgment in Royal Oak Mines.53 By contrast,
Donald J. cited Royal Oak and sought to reconcile the conficting case law
by re-grounding the good faith requirement in MPAO’s emphasis on “approximate equality.” According to Donald J.: “To summarize, good faith from
a constitutional perspective, has been described by the Supreme Court of
Canada as requiring the parties to meet and engage in meaningful dialogue
where positions are explained and each party reads, listens to, and considers
representations made by the other. Parties’ positions must not be infexible
and intransigent, and parties must honestly strive to fnd a middle ground”.54
His judgment then turns to the issue of unequal bargaining power to justify
an inquiry into the substantive reasonableness of the government’s bargaining positions in the constitutional context: “The government always has the
power to unilaterally resolve impasse through legislation, or force workers
to end a strike through constitutionally compliant back-to-work legislation.
This is a huge power imbalance that fundamentally alters the calculus of how
negotiations unfold”.55
Had the SCC agreed with Justice Donald’s judgment in its entirely, then we
could be reassured that the limited duty of good faith expressed in Fraser has
been rejected and that the constitutional standard of good faith bargaining re52 Ibid at paras 141-148.
53 Royal Oak Mines, supra note 15.
54 BCTF (2015), supra note 3 at para 334.
55 Ibid at para 339.
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quires the parties to make reasonable efforts to fnd an acceptable compromise.
Even more importantly, we could be reassured that the amelioration of unequal
bargaining power is at the heart of any interpretation of the requirement of
freedom of association in the labour context. However, the SCC passed on the
chance to provide that reassurance.
With regard to ambiguities around the level of government interference that
will make its actions unconstitutional, there is no doubt that MPAO restored the
“substantial interference” standard and that Fraser’s impossibility test has been
set aside. The BCCA’s BCTF judgments do not delve into this part of the jurisprudence. Nevertheless, there is a very important issue lurking here. Assuming a
constitutionally valid collectively bargaining regime must enable workers acting
collectively to deal with their employers from a position of approximate equality,
when is that achieved and when does government action (or inaction) substantially interfere with it?

Conclusion
It is not surprising that the SCC’s articulation of constitutionalized labour
rights is a work-in-progress and replete with ambiguities. The construction of
constitutional labour rights can neither escape the contradictions of the socioeconomic structure in which they operate nor the statutory and jurisprudential labour rights regime that developed within it. It is extremely unlikely, for
example, that the SCC will pursue its “approximate equality” analysis to the
point of holding that existing collective bargaining regimes are unconstitutional
because they now fail to meet that standard. However, neither is the constitutional labour rights regime bound to refect and reinforce the compromises
reached at a particular time and place, especially given their unstable normative, political, and economic foundations. Finally, for the same reasons, it is
also likely that the constitutional labour rights regime will remain unstable and
replete with unresolved ambiguities. So while it may be disappointing that the
SCC took a school holiday in BCTF, it will, like school holidays, be short-lived.
The court will inevitably be back on the job, grappling with the remaining ambiguities, and perhaps creating new ones, in respect of the constitutional limits
on government imposed wage controls, collective bargaining restructuring or
back-to-work legislation.56

56 So much for my promise not to make predictions.
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SUMMARY

BC Teachers’ Federation v British Columbia:
The Supreme Court Takes a School Holiday
Constitutional labour rights in Canada now protect workers’ freedom to organize and bargain collectively and to strike. These associational freedoms are
especially important for public sector workers, the most frequent targets of legislation limiting their freedoms. However, the Supreme Court of Canada judgments
recognizing these rights and freedoms have also introduced important ambiguities about their foundation, scope and level of protection. This brief comment locates these ambiguities in the context of Canada’s political economy and industrial
relations regime, which are beset by contradiction and confict. It then explores
the origins and development of the jurisprudential ambiguities in constitutional
labour rights through a survey of recent Supreme Court of Canada’s labour rights
judgments, including most recently British Columbia Teachers’ Federation and British Columbia (2016).
KEywordS: Freedom of Association, Constitutional Labour rights, Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Collective Bargaining, Supreme Court of Canada.

RÉSUMÉ

BC Teachers ‘Federation c Colombie-Britannique :
La Cour suprême prend un congé scolaire.
Les droits constitutionnels du travail au Canada protègent aujourd’hui la liberté des travailleurs de s’organiser, de négocier collectivement et de faire la grève.

616

RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS – 73-3, 2018

Ces libertés associatives sont particulièrement importantes pour les travailleurs du
secteur public parce que ces derniers constituent les cibles les plus fréquentes de
législations limitant ces libertés. de surcroît, les jugements de la Cour suprême du
Canada reconnaissant ces droits et libertés ont introduit d’importantes ambiguïtés
quant à leur fondement, leur portée et leur niveau de protection. Ce bref commentaire situe ces ambiguïtés dans le contexte du régime d’économie politique et
des relations industrielles du Canada, lequel est en proie à des contradictions et
à des confits. Il explore, ensuite, les origines et le développement des ambiguïtés
jurisprudentielles dans les droits constitutionnels du travail à travers une étude des
derniers jugements de la Cour suprême du Canada sur les droits du travail, dont
récemment British Columbia Teachers’ Federation c Colombie-Britannique (2016).
MoTS-CLéS : liberté d’association, droit constitutionnel du travail, Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, négociation collective, Cour suprême du Canada.

